Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Action' and 'The Making of a Philosopher'

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25 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
22167 Our images of bodies are not produced by the bodies, but by our own minds [Augustine, by Aquinas]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
22117 Our minds grasp reality by direct illumination (rather than abstraction from experience) [Augustine, by Matthews]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
4691 If all mental life were conscious, we would be unable to see things, or to process speech [McGinn]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
4690 If meaning is speaker's intentions, it can be reduced to propositional attitudes, and philosophy of mind [McGinn]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
22118 Augustine created the modern concept of the will [Augustine, by Matthews]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
4348 Love, and do what you will [Augustine]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
7821 Pagans produced three hundred definitions of the highest good [Augustine, by Grayling]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
22119 Augustine said (unusually) that 'ought' does not imply 'can' [Augustine, by Matthews]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
22116 Augustine identified Donatism, Pelagianism and Manicheism as the main heresies [Augustine, by Matthews]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
19338 Augustine said evil does not really exist, and evil is a limitation in goodness [Augustine, by Perkins]